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COMMENT
AMERICA CINCHES ITS PURSE STRINGS ON
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: NAVIGATING SECTION 8(A)




Generally speaking, tribal economics and tribally owned business ventures
in the United States have a rocky historical condition.' Only recently have
certain tribes and tribal entities2 seen much economic development.
Unfortunately, great disparity exists between those tribes that have "hit the
jackpot" and those that continue to sink deeper into poverty.3 Yet, for better
or worse, since the inception of the nation, the United States federal
government has taken an active role in tribal economics.4
In recent years, the active role taken by the federal government is providing
economic opportunities to tribally owned businesses. Through the auspices of
the Small Business Administration, Congress took a large step in providing
economic incentives for tribes to create for-profit business entities separate
from their tribal governments and to use those entities to procure lucrative
contracts with the United States government. Specifically, the Department of
Defense granted and continues to grant billions of dollars worth of contracts
to tribal businesses through advantageous and often extremely truncated
* Associate with Barrow & Grimm, P.C., Tulsa, Okla. Member, Citizen Potawatomi
Nation.
1. See John L. Williams, Paving the Way for the Future: Potential Structures for Tribal
Economic Development, 2 UCLA INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' J. OF L., CULTURE & RESISTANCE 59
(2005), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/ipjlcr/volume2/williams.pdf. This article provides
the definitive history of tribal economics in America.
2. Unless otherwise noted, throughout this comment references to "Indians," "Natives,"
"Indian tribe(s)," "tribes," or "Native Americans" include federally recognized tribes and
Alaska Native Corporations.
3. For an example of a tribe with economic success and legal maneuvering bordering on
the ridiculous, see BRETr DUvAL FROMSON, HrrrING THE JACKPOT (2003), and for recognition
of many other tribes that continue to suffer economic hardships, see Williams, supra note 1, at
84 (noting that "Indian country still suffers from widespread poverty").
4. Williams, supra note 1.
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bidding processes. In response, protestors, through legal, political, and public
fora, often express outrage at the success of certain Indian tribes and Alaska
Native Corporations,5 citing abuse of the bidding and contracting processes
and government corruption.6 The protestors claim that certain Indian tribes
and Alaska Native Corporations procure government contracts unfairly, to the
detriment of non-tribal competing businesses and the taxpayer at large.'
The most significant claims of alleged corruption concern funneling
government contract work and proceeds to businesses that do not themselves
procure the contracts and would not qualify for government contract awards.
This concept is known in the government contracting community as a "pass-
through."8 In other words, the business entity qualifying for a government-
awarded contract procures such contract and subcontracts some or all of the
work (and thus the proceeds) to a non-qualifying entity. Hence, public outrage
ensues, and legal, political, and public media ramifications reflect negatively
on the business, the owning tribe, and the entire Native community.
This comment explains how such problems arise with respect to the
government contracting process and provides approaches and advice for
tribally owned businesses. Part I of this comment outlines the historical
treatment of Indian-owned businesses and Alaskan Native Corporations in the
United States, including the development of tribal economics and the
enactment of the Section 8(a) Business Development Program (the 8(a) BD
program). Part II discusses the problems, legally and in the court of public
5. "Alaska Natives, including Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts, have the same legal status as
members of Indian tribes singled out as political entities in the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution." COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.07(3)(a) (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., Michie 2005); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Thus, Alaska Native
Corporations are treated substantially the same as Indian tribes under all of the provisions
mentioned in this article. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4) (2006). One substantive difference is the
ease with which Alaska Native Corporations can obtain status as a business that qualifies for
government contracting advantages. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a)(2), (a)(4) (2006). However,
tribally owned business concerns, governed by the same provision, can still qualify with relative
ease compared to non-tribal entities. Id. § 124.109(b) (showing Indian tribes have more to
prove insofar as "economic disadvantage" is concerned, but "social disadvantage" is presumed).
6. See e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILrrY OFFICE, REPORTNO. GAO-06-399, CONTRACT
MANAGEMENT INCREASED USE OF ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS' SPECIAL 8(A) PROVISIONS
CALLS FOR TAILORED OVERSIGHT 22-23 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d06399.pdf [hereinafter REPORT No. GAO-06-399]; Jenny J. Yang, Note, Small Business,
Rising Giant: Policies and Costs of Section 8(a) Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native
Corporations, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 315, 337 (2006).
7. Yang, supra note 6, at 377.




opinion, that arise when tribal businesses take advantage of the 8(a) BD
program. Part III provides strategies for avoiding the pitfalls of government
contracting in the 8(a) BD program, including maintaining eligibility for
contracts. Finally, Part IV reveals strategies to prepare for the future under the
8(a) BD program, as well as suggesting courses of action for developing
tribally owned small businesses.
L A Brief History ofIndian Economics and Business in the United States
To understand the development of the Small Business Administration and
federal programs offering aid to Native Americans, a brief look at the history
of tribal economics and business in America is necessary. The context within
which tribal economies developed is also necessary in understanding and
forming opinions about the nature of government aid to tribal businesses
today, and such context is useful in tempering the public perception about
these government initiatives. This section outlines the historical advancement
of Native American business enterprises in general.9 Then, this comment will
focus on the more narrow issue of federal programs enacted to remedy the
poverty and economic stagnancy of Indian tribes in America.
A. Federal Policy on Indian Business and Economics
Although post-Revolutionary America did not want to deal with the legal
aspects of unilaterally assuming jurisdiction over its native peoples,'" it finally
realized the tribes maintained some level of authority over their own kind.
From 1823 to 1832, the Supreme Court recognized inherent tribal sovereignty
with the Marshall Trilogy." Tribal sovereignty recognizes the right of the
tribes to control the internal aspects of self-governance. 2 Although the
Supreme Court set forth this judicial mandate, recognizing the political
autonomy of tribes, the executive and legislative branches of government still
maintained control over tribal activity through relocation and creation of
9. Williams, supra note 1.
10. Id. at 67.
11. Through the Marshall Trilogy, the infamous Chief Justice John Marshall defined tribal
sovereignty. The Trilogy: Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832).
12. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1; Worcester, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515; see also Williams, supra note 1.
No. 2]
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reservations in the first hundred years of American interaction with its native
peoples.' 3
Upon relocation and creation of tribal reservations, tribes became isolated
from economic relations outside of the tribe. 4 Most tribes resiliently
maintained their culture and government, although many became necessarily
dependent on the government for federal subsidies and cash handouts, which
exposed their tribal economy to "interference from Washington."' 5 In essence,
the government created a dependency system whereby it could control the
tribes' economic fate.'6 Yet, even in the face of this government policy, many
tribes were able to develop successful economies. 7 Such successful tribes
based their success on their affirmed property rights in the reservation land and
from their intact tribal governments protected by the Marshall Trilogy."
Over the next hundred years, disagreement among the Supreme Court,
Congress, and politicians in Washington created an incongruous and
incomprehensible federal policy on tribes and tribal economic development. 9
Commentators refer colloquially to this era as a "rollercoaster ride" in federal
Indian policy.20 Contradiction belied every decision imposed upon the tribes
by a federal government in which they had no representation, because of
course, tribal citizens could not vote for congressional representation. 2' By
1871, Congress passed an act disallowing and making illegal negotiating
treaties or contracting with Indian tribes or individual Indians. 22 Moreover, by
1886, the Supreme Court had established Congress's plenary power over tribal
sovereignty,23 which has been described as "absolute" authority over tribes.
24









22. Act of Mar. 8, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 570 ("That hereafter no contract or
agreement of any kind shall be made by any person, with any tribe of Indians, or individual
Indian not a citizen of the United States....").
23. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (finding congressional authority based
on dependency); see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,323 (1978) (stating that tribal
sovereignty "exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance");
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding congressional authority to abrogate
treaties).




Without anyone with whom to contract, and being subject to nearly absolute
congressional control, Indians depended upon the government for any
economic interaction." Thus, where the business world demands stability and
predictability for success, Indian tribes were ostracized from external business
opportunities by law and could not predict what move the federal government
would make next in regard to their tribal sovereignty and contracting rights.26
Indian tribes and privately owned Indian businesses could not thrive in a
market that excluded them from participating.
Under Congress' established plenary power, the unpredictable exercise of
control over tribes resulted in detrimental impacts to tribal governments in the
late 1800s through the turn of the century. After indirectly removing tribes'
ability to make contracts, Congress began whittling away at the last and
greatest asset the tribes had, their land." By privatizing communal tribal land
holdings, Congress allotted some of the tribal lands back to individual tribal
members and sold the rest to non-Indians.28 The congressional allotment
programs put two-thirds of Indian land into the possession of non-Indians,
resulting in widespread poverty among the tribes.29 Throughout the 1920s and
early 1930s, the abysmal result of Congress's allotment scheme alongside
"arrogant and undirected" federal Indian programs "could be seen on every
reservation: landless Indians living in incredible poverty, an infant mortality
rate more than twice that of the white population, widespread alcoholism and
crime.
30
At least initially, legislation stemming from the Great Depression did not
overlook the plight of Indian tribes.3' New Deal initiatives were extended to
25. Note the cyclical nature of the dependency: because Congress took away the
contracting rights and controls tribal sovereignty, Congress also must act to protect the
dependent tribes.
26. See generally Williams, supra note 1, at 73.
27. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. The tribes' land base remains
the most lucrative asset available to a tribe, as "Indian nations still control 56 million acres of
land-two percent of the land mass of the United States-and substantial natural resources.
Some tribes rely on these resources to rebuild their economic base .... COHEN'S HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, § 21.01.
28. 24 Stat. at 388-90.
29. Williams, supra note 1, at 75; see also THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT:
CONGRESSES AND BILLS 28 (Vine Deloria, Jr. ed., 2002) (quoting the remarks of John Collier
from the Minutes of the Plains Congress, Rapid City, South Dakota, March 2, 1934).
30. Williams, supra note 1, at 75; see also GRAHAM D. TAYLOR, THE NEW DEAL AND
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBALISM: THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT,
1934-35, at 9 (1980).
31. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, § 4.04(3)(a)(i) ("The
No. 2]
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Indians in the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),32 which was appropriately
referred to as the "Indian New Deal., 33 The IRA reversed some of the effects
of the allotment policy, returning lands to tribal ownership.34 From the
passage of the IRA in 1934 until the coming of World War H, the federal
government made a concerted effort to restore tribal autonomy by promoting
the growth and rehabilitation of tribal governments and economies. 35 This
effort included "Oklahoma tribes and Alaskan Native groups that were
originally excluded from [the IRA]. 36 Most importantly, to chronicle the
development of tribally owned businesses, the IRA was one of the first
attempts by the federal government to "[fund] the organization of governments
and tribal corporations for select tribes., 37 By 1940, mixed sentiment toward
the effects of the Indian New Deal emerged in Congress, as some members of
Congress felt the IRA was not promoting its purpose of creating tribal
autonomy but rather putting control over tribal resources into the hands of
tribal corporations that would neither cooperate with nor benefit their local
economies.38 Although Congress made a temporary shift in favor of tribal
autonomy and tribally owned businesses, the coming of World War II stifled
the voices of Indian New Deal promoters and continued the incongruous
federal policy toward tribes, to the detriment of tribally owned businesses.
39
Instead of absolute federal control over tribes through Congress's plenary
power and federal handouts, by the 1950s Congress was ready to terminate
many tribes altogether.40 Congress's termination policy gave tribes the rights
and duties of regular American citizens, allowing tribes to bring claims against
federal government's efforts to transform governance in Indian country accelerated with
publication in 1928 of the influential Meriam Report, which documented widespread poverty
and extensive BIA mismanagement and administrative abuse throughout Indian country. As
a new generation of reformers advocated increased respect for native life ways, the federal
government passed legislation aimed at reestablishing tribal governance, reconstituting tribal
land bases, and revitalizing tribal economies and cultures. The most prominent and
comprehensive of these measures was the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA).").
32. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
33. Williams, supra note 1, at 76; see also TAYLOR, supra note 30, at 121.
34. Williams, supra note 1, at 76.
35. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, § 21.01.
36. Williams, supra note 1, at 76.
37. Id. (emphasis added); see also ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED
STATES (7th ed. 1984).
38. See TAYLOR, supra note 30.
39. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, § 4.04(3)(a)(i);
Williams, supra note 1, at 76.




the United States as they arose in the termination process." Yet, termination
policy was short-lived as state and local governments were unwilling to take
on the burden of policing and maintaining jurisdiction over the newly
disbanded tribes.42 After the outrage expressed by state and local governments
and prompting from the Executive, Congress made its final attempt to enact
a comprehensive federal policy toward tribes. The official policy would be
"self-determination.'4
President Nixon did not officially endorse self-determination policy until
1970, and by that time, tribes were in dire need of economic rehabilitation to
overcome the "economic and cultural disaster" of the government's
termination policy." Self-determination remains the modem federal policy
toward tribes, allowing tribal autonomy in intratribal affairs, including
sovereign governments and court systems, alongside some economic
stimulation from the federal government.45
In furtherance of self-determination policy, Congress passed the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) in 1971, which established the current
corporate model under which Alaska Natives continue to operate today.
46
Although Alaska Natives have the "same legal status as members of Indian
tribes" in the lower forty-eight states, their specific claims to hunting and
fishing rights on Alaskan land brought about their unique status as members
of "native corporations." '7 That is, the ANSCA settled and extinguished all of
the Alaska Native's claims to ancestral land rights and vested the proceeds of
the settlement in "state-chartered native corporations.' 48 The ANSCA gave
native Alaskan citizens stock in their respective regional native corporation. 49
Through the corporation, the shareholders own their ancestral land,
congressional appropriations, and oil royalties. 50  Although the Alaska
Natives' rights are governed by this unique corporate scheme, for purposes of
this article they are treated as any other Indian tribe, unless otherwise noted.
41. Id. at 78.
42. Id.
43. H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, at 1-3 (1970).
44. Id.
45. Williams, supra note 1, at 79.
46. Alaska Native Claims SettlementAct, Pub. L. No. 92-203,85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-29 (2000)).
47. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, § 4.07(3)(a).
48. Id.; 43 U.S.C. § 1606, 1607, 1613.
49. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, § 4.07(3)(b)(ii)(B); 43
U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1613.
50. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, § 4.07(3)(b)(ii)(B).
No. 2]
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Since the commencement of self-determination policy and the enactment of
ANSCA, many tribes "continue to confront serious issues of poverty and its
social consequences."'" With unemployment rates as high as 85% on some of
the poorest reservations, and averaging 43% for all Indians living on or near
a reservation in 1999, the economic situation remains rather stark. 2 In fact,
in that same year, the "per capita income for reservation Indians was $8816"
for Indians living on reservations with gambling and $8466 for those
reservations without gambling. 3 Unfortunately, the "[h]ealth and social
welfare indicators are equally troubling," which provides Indian Country with
not only economic, but also survivalist incentives to prioritize the development
of their economies. 4
Concerns about current federal programs and oversight should be
considered within this context. After more than 200 years of disastrous federal
policy, many tribes still struggle to maintain any economic growth." Yet, the
chips have fallen in favor of some Indian tribes after such a long and drastic
folly of federal policies. The tribes, themselves, "may... be [the] facilitators
of the economic development efforts" so urgently needed in Indian Country
today.5 6 In fact, "[o]ne of the fastest growing sectors in the economy is the
private Native-owned business sector," providing self-sustaining support to
other tribal members.57 Native "small businesses may meet important
socioeconomic needs of individual members," and "[t]hey may also generate
tax revenue for the tribe," 58 while continuing to provide jobs and economic
stimulus to their surrounding communities as well.59
Today, many federal programs promote Indian business ventures. As
explained above, growth of tribal economies has been slow or nonextant in
most instances.60 In response, the federal government initiated many programs
to remedy the poverty and economic stagnancy of Indian tribes in America.
According to a study performed by the Government Accountability Office








59. See Weekend Edition Sunday: How the Recession is Affecting American Indians (NPR
radio broadcast, Feb. 8, 2009) (interview with Jacqueline Johnson Pata, Executive Director,
National Congress of American Indians) [hereinafter Weekend Edition].




(GAO) in December 2001, about 100 federal programs are available to tribes
and tribal members for economic development.61 Some of the programs are
used widely, while others remain virtually untouched by Indians, either
individually or as tribal entities.62 This comment focuses on one such
program, codified in Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, which focuses on
small businesses in general but tailors its provisions to allow Native American
businesses a leg up in government contracting.
B. History, Enactment, and Purpose of the Small Business Act, Section 8(a)
During World War II, the United States recognized the desirability of a
strong industrial production base and enacted the Small Business Assistance
Act of 1942.63 Thereafter, in continuation of such progress, Congress created
the Small Business Administration (SBA) in 1953 "to contract with
government procurement agencies to provide services and supplies, to
subcontract with small businesses, and to encourage subcontracting by prime
contractors with small businesses."' 4 The Small Business Act of 1958 (the
Act) made permanent the SBA and codified the scope of its contracting
powers.65
Specifically, Congress empowered the SBA to grant government contracts
to qualifying small business entities.' To qualify, an entity must be a
"socially and economically disadvantaged small business concern" as defined
by the Act.67 In ordinary use, the Act defines a "small-business concern" as
a business that is "independently owned and operated" and "not dominant in
its field of operation. 65 The Act relaxes the "socially and economically
61. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT No. GAO-02-193, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA
NATIvES (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02l93.pdf.
62. For an in-depth discussion of both individual and tribal use of federal programs
available to Indians, see the U.S. Government Accountability Office report on federal assistance
programs. Id.
63. Pub. L. No. 77-603, 56 Stat. 351 ("An act [t]o mobilize the productive facilities of
small business in the interests of successful prosecution of the war, and for other purposes");
Yang, supra note 6, at 319; see also JOHN C. MCBRIDE & THOMAS J. TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS: CYCLOPEDIC GUIDE TO LAW, ADMINISTRATION, PROCEDURE § 48.10 (2005).
64. Yang, supra note 6, at 319 (citing Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163,67
Stat. 232).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 637 (2006).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 637(a)(1)(B).
68. Id. § 632(a)(1).
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disadvantaged" requirement for tribally owned small businesses. s9 The Act
defines such a disadvantaged tribal entity as a small business with at least 5 1%
ownership by an "economically disadvantaged Indian tribe (or a wholly owned
business entity of such tribe)."7  This section of the Act has particular
ramifications for business entity planning because it requires that "the
management and daily business operations of [a] small business concern [be]
controlled by one or more ... members of an economically disadvantaged
Indian tribe. ,7. That is, the Indian tribe or ANC must not merely own the
business, but must also control the daily business operations to qualify for
government contracts under the Act.72 As discussed in detail below, the
regulations set forth by the SBA provide the real substance of the Act's
requirements for Indian tribes.
7 3
As stated in the first section of the SBA regulations, Section 8(a) of the Act
authorized the SBA to create a "Minority Small Business and Capital
Ownership Development program," also known as the "8(a) Business
Development or '8(a) BD' program."'74 "The purpose of the 8(a) BD program
is to assist eligible small disadvantaged business concerns to compete in the
American economy through business development., 75 The regulations parse
no words in codifying the congressional aspiration to give certain minority
businesses a competitive advantage. The realization of this advantage is
through contracting rules that the regulations deem "Contractual Assistance.
76
The contractual assistance provisions authorize the SBA to disregard the
usual competitive government bidding process to favor Indian tribes and
ANCs.77 The Act specifically provides that "[i]t shall be the duty of the
69. Id. § 637(a)(4).
70. Id. § 637(a)(4)(A)(i)(II) (forprivately owned entities); seealso Id. § 637(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I)
(for publicly owned entities, requiring 51% stock ownership).
71. Id. § 637(a)(4)(B)(ii).
72. Though not litigated or discussed in other sources, this provision clearly impacts the
analysis of whether work done on government contracts awarded to a tribe can be subcontracted
to non-tribally-owned businesses. That is, the "pass-through" concept discussed in Part II.A.
73. See 13 C.F.R. pt. 124 (2006).
74. Id. § 124.1.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 124.501 (heading appearing just above this section).
77. For the usual process requiring competition in government bidding, see 41 U.S.C. §
253(a) (2000) (stating that a procurement agency must obtain "full and open competition
through the use of competitive procedures"). But see id. § 253(cX5) (stating that a procurement
agency may dispense with competitive procedures when a statute "expressly authorizes or
requires that the procurement be made . . . from a specified source"). For the specific




Administration and it is hereby empowered" to enter into contracts with any
government department or agency to provide goods, services, or perform
construction work."8 Then, after the SBA procures the contract it shall
"arrange for the performance of such procurement contracts by negotiating or
otherwise letting subcontracts to socially and economically disadvantaged
small business concerns . . . . 79 Thus, this is a non-competitive process
whereby a government agency, the SBA, procures contracts from other
government agencies and passes them along to qualifying small business
concerns, such as Indian tribes.
This lack of competition has raised some eyebrows, but at least one court
upheld this preferential treatment in the face of the typical government policy
requiring competition among bidders.8 " Furthermore, the Supreme Court
refused to enter the debate on government contracting preferences for tribes,
allowing the reasoning to stand, at least in the Fifth Circuit, that Indian tribes
are among a unique political or indigenous classification, not an impermissible
race-based classification. The procedure for awarding the contracts to a
qualifying small business concern, also set forth in the SBA regulations,
explains how the SBA engages in contracting assistance.8"
In some shape or form, the SBA truncates a typical competitive bidding
process to award contracts to qualifying small business concerns. The Act
empowers the SBA "to make an award" to the qualifying small business
concerns,' but it does not require a truly competitive process, even among the
eligible small business concerns.8 5 Instead, the regulations give the SBA a
choice concerning how it wants to conduct the contract award process.8 6
Essentially, "8(a) contracts may either be sole source awards", that is, awards
78. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A) (2006).
79. Id. § 637(a)(l)(B).
80. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 708-09 (5th Cir. 1973)
(holding that "section 8(a)... clearly constitutes specific statutory authority to dispense with
competition" and thus, "subcontracts under the section 8(a) program may be awarded on a
noncompetitive basis"); see 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(5).
81. See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 330 F.3d 513, 516-17, 520-21
(D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1088 (2003). But see Roth Dev. Corp. v. Dep't of Def.,
545 F.3d 1023, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding the SBA statute allowing Indian tribes-and
other minority groups--the automatic presumption of socially disadvantaged business status,
and thus the benefits of such status, is subject to strict scrutiny).
82. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.501.520 (2007).
83. Id.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(C) (2006).
85. Id. § 637(a)(1)(D).
86. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.501(b).
No. 2]
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given directly to the qualifying small business, or "awards won through
competition with other Participants.""7
To "increase their prospects of receiving sole source [or noncompetitive]
8(a) contracts," the regulations encourage the tribes to "market their
capabilities to appropriate procuring activities."88 Once the business markets
itself in accordance with the regulations, the SBA can award the contracts in
three ways: (1) it may open up competition among all 8(a) qualifying
businesses to submit bids; (2) it may allow the 8(a) business to contract
directly with the government agency or department offering the contract for
procurement; or (3) it may procure the contract from a government agency on
behalf of the 8(a) Program and award it to a single 8(a) business on a "sole
source," noncompetitive basis, as described above. 9 To reduce inefficiency
within the SBA, most government agencies enact a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the SBA, allowing them authority to contract
directly with the 8(a) business."
Moreover, Indian-owned businesses are not subject to the general rule that
limits the amount of a contract that may be given via a sole-source award.9
This means the SBA can procure a contract specifically for a single tribal
business and award that contract without competition or agreement among the
other 8(a) businesses. Yet, qualifying tribally owned 8(a) businesses have
even more incentive to contract with the federal government. Unlike other
8(a) businesses, tribally owned businesses are not limited on the total amount
of contract dollars available.92 That is, the ceiling capping the amount of 8(a)
contract money available is lifted for tribally owned businesses. This is
colloquially termed "Super 8(a)" status.9 In short, this is a powerful and
lucrative scheme whereby tribes can obtain enormous government contracts.
Furthermore, federal agencies have a mandate to contract with 8(a) Program
participants, as discussed in Part I.A below, and an agency's "total value of
87. Id. § 124.501(b).
88. Id. § 124.501(e).
89. 13 C.F.R. § 124.502 to 503; see Yang, supra note 6, at 320-21.
90. REPORTNo. GAO-06-399, supra note 6, at 1-2; see, e.g., Memorandum from the Office
of the Under Sec'y of Def. on Class Deviation-New 8(a) Partnership Agreement Between the
U.S. Small Business Administration and the Dep't of Def. to the Dirs. of Def. Agencies (Feb.
28,2007) (effective through Sept. 30,2009), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/policy/
8(a)%2OPartnership%2OAgreement%2OExtension%20thru%2009302009.pdf.
91. 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(a)(1)(iii), (b) (2006).
92. Id. § 124.519(a).
93. For an example, see Small Business Association (SBA) "Super 8(a)" Organizations,




contracts and subcontracts issued" to 8(a) participants cannot "drop below an
annual minimum of five percent." By using the MOUs and "Super 8(a)"
status, government contracting officers can meet their SBA contracting quotas
with a few large awards. As a result, ANCs and tribal 8(a) companies are
targeted by larger companies to use them as a pass-through entity and
ultimately capture the proceeds of a federal contract. Thus, the contracting
procedure is advantageous for businesses, if they can qualify.
C. Qualifying for and Maintaining Section 8(a) Status
As described above, the federal government directly awards enormous
lucrative contracts to tribally owned businesses under the 8(a) BD program,
including construction projects and military services contracts.95 Accordingly,
these projects gain the most attention from competing bidders, government
oversight committees, the media, and taxpayers at large. Under such scrutiny,
tribes must ensure they continue to qualify for 8(a) status, and tribes must
diligently maintain such qualification.
One underlying problem concerns the level of control the qualifying tribal
entity must have over the work performed on a contract. Providing guidance
for qualification and maintenance of 8(a) status, the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) sets forth a vast resource of information organized in
question-and-answer format to determine if a given entity qualifies for 8(a)
status.9 6 For tribes and ANCs, the crux of these requirements is set forth in
Section 124. 109.97
1. General Eligibility Requirements
To qualify, tribally owned businesses must meet certain conditions to
participate in the 8(a) BD program.98 Initially, the tribe must own at least 51%
of the business entity.99 Secondly, the tribe must organize the business "for
profit" as a "separate and distinct legal entity" with "articles of organization
[containing] express sovereign immunity waiver language."'" Moreover, the
94. Yang, supra note 6, at 321 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (2006)).
95. See discussion supra Part I.B.
96. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.1-124.704 (2006).
97. Id. § 124.109.
98. Id. § 124.109(c).
99. Id. § 124.109(c)(3)(i) (noting that "a tribe must own at least 51 percent of the voting
stock and at least 51 percent of the aggregate of all classes of stock," and "[flor non-corporate
entities, a tribe must own at least a 51 percent interest.").
100. Id. § 124.109(c)(1). Note that the waiver of sovereign immunity also requires the
business to subject itself to the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts. Id. However, ANCs are not
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tribe must meet the "size" requirements relative to their particular industry
classifications.'0 ' Yet, the regulations require more than simply organizing the
business. The tribe must also show a "[p]otential for success... as evidenced
by income tax returns for each of the two previous years showing operating
revenues in the primary industry in which the applicant is seeking 8(a)...




requirements, which are closely analyzed below, as control and management
of the daily business activities is a primary concern when scrutinizing potential
pass-through subcontracts.' 4 But first, the Native business must hurdle the
most intrinsic eligibility requirement, meeting socially and economically
disadvantaged status.
2. Qualifying as "Socially and Economically Disadvantaged"
As stated above, Congress granted the Small Business Administration the
power to determine what entities qualify as "disadvantaged small business
concerns" for purposes of favorable government contracting. 0 5  The
regulations promulgated by the SBA make qualifying for "socially and
economically disadvantaged small business" status much easier for Indian
tribes and ANCs than for other small business concerns. °6 ANCs need not
prove social or economic disadvantage at all,0 7 and tribes need only prove
economic disadvantage, as social disadvantage is assumed.'0° Moreover, tribes
required to include any of this language. Id. § 124.109(a)(6).
101. Id. § 124.109(c)(2). Since the focus of this paper is on control requirements and
performance obligations, especially concerning subcontracting, a detailed discussion of the SBA
size requirements is not appropriate. But see 13 C.F.R. § 121 for the details of size
requirements, and consult the SBA website at OHA Size Cases, http://www.sba.gov/
aboutsba/sbaprograms/oha/allcases/sizecases (last visited July 15, 2009) for specific cases
concerning the proper size of a qualifying company.
102. 13. C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(6). The SBA will also look to factors including "technical and
managerial experience", "financial capacity", and the business' prior "record of performance"
on contracts within its designated industry. Id. § 124.109(c)(6)(ii).
103. See id. § 124.109(c)(4).
104. See discussion infra Parts IC.3, II.A.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (2006) (giving the Small Business Administration additional powers
to determine rules for "[p]rocurement contracts; subcontracts to disadvantaged small business
concerns; performance bonds; contract negotiations;... construction subcontracts;... Indian
tribes").
106. Id. § 637(a)(l)(B); see 13 C.F.R. § 124.109.
107. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a).
108. Id. § 124.109(b). The regulations specifically list the data that non-ANC tribally-owned




need only prove economic disadvantage once, as tribes are not required to
comply with this aspect of the SBA's annual reviews," 9 and the economically
disadvantaged status applies as to all subsidiaries of the tribally owned
business. "o0 However, qualifying for 8(a) status remains a difficult task, and,
according to one commentator, many entities lack information about adhering
to the strict 8(a) requirements for maintaining qualification once the SBA
approves their 8(a) application, due to no fault of their own."'
3. Maintaining 8(a) Status and "Control" of the Business
A tribally owned business must comply with the often cumbersome
requirements to "remain eligible to participate in the 8(a) BD Program."
' 12
That is, tribes must follow certain housekeeping requirements, including
annual submissions "[a]s part of an annual review."'1 3 One such pertinent
submission is a "certification that there have been no changed circumstances
which could adversely affect the Participant's program eligibility.""' 4 For
instance, if the tribe changed its corporate ownership since the last annual
review, the tribe "must inform SBA of any changes and provide relevant
supporting documentation" for such changes." 5 Moreover, the SBA may
subject the tribe to "eligibility reviews" if it receives "specific and credible
information alleging a Participant no longer meets the eligibility
requirements ... ,."' Thus, the tribe and its counsel must consider SBA
eligibility and reporting requirements when making most daily business
decisions.
Another important business consideration concerns the requirement that
tribal entities have control over the daily business activity of their
businesses."' The CFR provides some flexibility about the way a tribally
109. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.112(a) (2006).
110. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(b).
111. Sharon McLoone, Report: SBA Should Better Educate 8(a) Applicants, WASH. POST,
Nov. 24, 2008, available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/small-business/2008/1 1/report_
sbashouldbetter educa.html; REPORT No. GAO-06-399, supra note 6, at 22-23.
112. 13 C.F.R. § 124.112(a).
113. Id. § 124.112(b).
114. Id. § 124.112(b)(2).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 124.112(c)(1).
117. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.101 (2006) (requiring a small business be "unconditionally owned
and controlled by one or more socially and economically disadvantaged individuals"). But see
13 C.F.R. § 124.106 (2006) (noting that the "Participant's management and daily business
operations must be conducted by one or more disadvantaged individuals, except for concerns
owned by Indian tribes, ANCs .... ).
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owned small business can maintain control so as to allow growth for an
inexperienced business. The tribe may have complete control over the daily
business operations "through one or more disadvantaged individual members
[of the tribe] who possess sufficient management experience of an extent and
complexity needed to run the concern" or through management teams made
up of tribal members."' For inexperienced businesses, the SBA provides a
third option whereby the concern can team with non-tribal members as a path
to future control of the business, however, the SBA must approve a written
plan to qualify a management team having non-tribal members." 9 Yet, the
crux of the control requirements, as they relate to pass-through considerations,
is summed up in the pertinent CFR section titled, "What percentage of work
must a Participant perform on an 8(a) contract?"'' 0 These specific
requirements provide the guidance for 8(a) contractors and are explained in
detail in Part II.A below.
Navigating the CFR is a difficult task for any tribal business. Discerning
what constitutes an acceptable level of control is an important question for the
Native business to answer in order to maintain compliance with the federal
contracting rules. Unfortunately, neither court nor administrative decisions
provide reliable guidance on pass-through subcontracting, 12 although, it is
clear that public outrage arises over such subcontracting. 12   The normal
business practices of a general contractor bidding on a government contract
blur where the tribe is merely a shell entity, formed with the sole purpose of
obtaining a lucrative contract under little or no competitive scrutiny.
Protestors allege that non-tribal entities, and tribal entities alike, profit to the
detriment of competitors in the market and the taxpayer at large. 23 The
process seems to reek of corruption, but statutorily the procedures set forth by
the SBA and the Act are followed in most instances. So two questions remain,
what are the pitfalls of government contracting and how do tribes avoid these
problems?
118. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(4)(i),(i)(A) (2006).
119. Id. § 124.109(c)(4)(i)(B).
120. 13 C.F.R. § 124.510 (2006).
121. See generally Chapman Law Firm v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 519, 528 (2005);
Appeal of Floorpro, Inc., 7-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 33,615, 2007 WL 1978045, at *13 (Armed Servs.
Bd. of Contract Appeals June 27, 2007); In re Operational Support & Servs., No. B-299660.2,
2007 WL 3146270, at *3 (Comptroller Gen. Decisions Sept. 24, 2007); Myers Investigative &
Sec. Servs., Inc., Nos. B-286971.2, B-286971.3, 2001 WL 322776, at *4 (Comptroller Gen.
Decisions Apr. 2, 2001).
122. McLoone, supra note 111; REPORT No. GAO-06-399, supra note 6.




II. The Pitfalls of Section 8(a) Contracting
Part II sets forth key problems that arise for tribes participating in the 8(a)
BD program. Although some problems concern facial issues, or the public
image, others, such as "pass-though" subcontracting, can have adverse
pecuniary, as well as legal, ramifications. All Native businesses should
consider these issues when contracting with the federal government.
A. "Pass-Throughs" and Their Effect on 8(a) Determinations
A "pass-through", as the tribal business and legal communities have coined
the term, occurs when a tribal entity obtains a government contract and, in
turn, subcontracts all or part of the work to entities that do not qualify as
socially and economically disadvantaged.'24 Strictly speaking, pass-throughs
are illegal in 8(a) contracting, and Congress and the Executive continue to
closely scrutinize pass-throughs. 2 '
The CFR requires the 8(a) participant to perform the contract awarded.'26
This calls into question the legality of subcontracting some and certainly all
of the work under an 8(a) contract award. Specifically, "[i]n the case of a
contract for services (except construction), the concern will perform at least 50
percent of the cost of the contract incurred for personnel with its own
employees," and in the case of general contracting on construction projects,
"the concern will perform at least 15 percent of the cost of the contract with
its own employees (not including the costs of materials).' ' 2 7 Thus, this general
rule on the amount of work to be performed by the 8(a) qualifying business
entity provides the first level of guidance for the 8(a) contractor. However,
Native business concerns should be aware that recent changes to the
government's contracting guidelines have been enacted and stricter scrutiny
of government contracts is on the horizon.
124. REPORTNO. GAO-06-399, supra note 6, at 22-23; Yang, supra note 6, at 337.
125. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT No. GAO-08-269,
DEFENSE CONTRACTING, CONTRACT RISK A KEY FACTOR IN ASSESSING EXCESSIVE PASS-
THROUGH CHARGES (2008) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO8269.pdf. [hereinafter
REPORT No. GAO-08-269]; Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, Subject: Government Contracting, 2009 WL 534378 (White House) (Mar. 4,2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-
Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-Subject-Govemment/ [hereinafter Memorandum].
126. 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.510, 125.6 (2006).
127. 13 C.F.R. § 125.6(a)(1),(a)(3) (2006).
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1. Recent Administrative Rules Specifically Addressing Pass-Throughs
As described above, the SBA already has general procedures in place to
regulate companies that elect to subcontract work obtained through 8(a)
contract awards, but recent changes in the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FARs) are impacting government treatment of pass-through subcontracting
as well. 2 8 The FARs provide government contracting officers with uniform
language to use in all government contracts. 29 As its stated purpose indicates,
the system is designed to provide "uniform policies and procedures for
acquisition" to promote fairness and continuity in government contracts.
30
Unfortunately, the FARs cannot provide language for every contracting
situation, and the clauses provided by the FARs often lag behind changes in
the contracting environment."' Thus, the FARs drafters must continuously
make changes to the system to keep up with demands from Congress and from
GAO reports, which point the finger at inadequate acquisitions regulations as
one culprit in excessive government contracting expenditures.
32
One such GAO report, titled Contract Risk a Key Factor in Assessing
Excessive Pass-Through Charges,'33 details the need for better oversight of
pass-through subcontracting in a wide range of government contracts,
including contracts awarded through the 8(a) BD program. In an effort to
curtail the unexpected costs of paying subcontractors, the federal government
answered the GAO report with new additions to the FARs directed at
"excessive pass-through charges" in government contracts. ' 4 In fact, the
Department of Defense (DOD), the government agency most accused of
spending unwisely on tribes and ANCs, issued its own regulations specifically
addressing excessive pass-through charges.
13
As one of the biggest spenders among government agencies, and in turn
among the biggest spenders on 8(a) contracts, the DOD has its own set of
regulations to supplement the FARs. 36 The Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulations (DFARs) guide DOD contract officers on the specific
128. Codified at Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
129. See generally 48 C.F.R. § 1.101-9905.506 (2006).
130. Id. § 1.101.
131. See generally REPORT NO. GAO-08-269, supra note 125.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 14.






requirements of DOD contracts.'37 In May 2008, the DOD issued its new
DFARs addressing the pass-through charges the GAO accused it of paying.'3
Specifically, the new DFARs eliminate any pass-though charges not
previously agreed to by the DOD:
(b) General. The Government will not pay excessive pass-
though charges. The Contracting Officer has determined that there
will be no excessive pass-through charges, provided the Contractor
performs the disclosed value-added functions. 39
The DOD drafted these form clauses to eliminate any overpayment by the
general contractor to the subcontractors for failure to do the work itself 4 °
Yet, tribes should take notice that the contracting officer still has the unique
authority to determine if a contract contains "excessive pass-through
charges.
'' 41
As discussed at Part II.A above, the regulations already require general
contractors to perform a minimum percentage of the work on a given
project. 42 However, confusion among government contracting officials about
the proper language for pass-through subcontracting still causes Native firms
and government agencies problems both legally and in the public eye.
Although Native firms received negative associations with such problems in
the media, GAO reports consistently blamed government contracting
officials. 43 One GAO auditor stated that "for one contract we reviewed that
was awarded to an ANC firm, contracting officials had failed to include the
required FAR clause in the contract... .'" When the GAO auditors asked
contracting officials what caused their failure to include the FAR clauses, they
expressed their confusion, stating they "were unsure who should be monitoring
compliance" with the pass-through subcontracting limitations contained in the
FARs and CFR 45 As the GAO report on pass-throughs observed:
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 252.215-7004 & Alternate I(b) (allowing clause to be substituted).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 252.215-7004(b) & Alternate I(b) (allowing clause to be substituted).
142. 13 C.F.R. § 125.6(a)(1) & (a)(3) (2006).
143. See, e.g., REPORTNO. GAO-08-269, supra note 125; REPORTNO. GAO-06-399, supra
note 6, at 22-23.
144. REPoRTNo. GAO-08-269, supra note 125, at 14.
145. Id. at 14-15.
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Several other contracting officials we spoke to said they were
unsure of whose responsibility it is to monitor compliance with the
subcontracting limitations under these 8(a) contracts. They
recognized that they should be doing more to monitor compliance.
By not ensuring compliance with the limits on subcontracting
requirement, there is an increased risk that an inappropriate degree
of the work is being done by large businesses, raising questions
about the value added by the [tribally owned] firm."
Thus, tribally owned businesses must be versed in all of the government's
contracting rules. Essentially, the tribal contractor must be able to oversee the
work of the government contracting official to ensure all appropriate FAR and
DFAR clauses are included in their contract. Otherwise, the government
reserves the right to reexamine the contract and take back profits deemed in
excess of what the government desired to pay.'47
This lack of comprehension among the very officials charged with
determining whether a pass-through situation exists denotes the danger for
Native businesses. Tribal contractors must stay apprised of changes in
government contracting rules.
B. The Public Image
Just as the intricacies of government contracting create potential pitfalls, the
public perception of such contracting procedures creates another realm of
concerns for the tribal business. Even if Indian tribes exercise their
congressionally approved advantages in a perfectly legal manner, tribal
success often receives negative sentiment among industry competitors and the
media.'48 When Indian businesses thrive to the disadvantage of their
competitors, receiving bids in anti-competitive processes, competing
contractors become potential whistle-blowers. This negative attention affects
the public outlook on the entire Indian business community. Thus, the
following presents the political, public relations, and media fallout from
engaging in the SBA Section 8(a) bidding process without a tested business
plan for public relations.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 252.215-7004(b) & Alternate I(b) (allowing clause to be substituted); see also
supra text accompanying notes 134-39.




1. ANCs and Congress
A media frenzy erupted in 2005 over the alleged corruption of government
contracting provided to Alaska Native Corporations49, or ANCs, to which the
Act provides the same status as tribally owned businesses under Section
8(a). 5° Newspaper columns touting the anti-competitive nature of the no-bid
contracts given to these few corporations prompted unrest in Alaska,'
resulting in a GAO report specifically addressing pass-through
subcontracting. 52 The GAO released this report in 2006.' The report
criticized the use of Section 8(a) to procure government contracts for huge
ANCs, noting lack of oversight concerning where the proceeds of the contract
were going and who was actually performing the work done on the
contracts."54 The media associated this problem with ANCs and Senator Ted
Stevens of Alaska, who lobbied hard in Congress to create the ANC firms and
allow them access to 8(a) contracting.' 5 However, the report actually blamed
government contracting officials from various departments for failing to abide
by contracting rules.5 6
2. The Mississippi Choctaws, Jack Abramoff, and Katrina
Similar to the negative media attention experienced by ANCs, the
Mississippi Choctaws and many other tribes were connected with the lobbying
scandal with Jack Abramoff and received damaging negative media
attention. 157 For instance, reporters at the Seattle Weekly cited the Mississippi
149. Paula Dobbyn, Some Say No-bid, No-limit Government Commissions for Natives are
Unfair, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 19, 2006, at HI, available at 2006 WLNR 4685448;
see also Yang, supra note 6.
150. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(2006). Note that ANCs actually qualify for 8(a) status even easier
than Indian tribes because they do not have to prove economic hardship, but the same
subsection of the regulations otherwise governs them. Id.
151. See e.g., Dobbyn, supra note 149.
152. REPORT No. GAO-06-399, supra note 6.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 22-23.
155. Weld Royal, Facing a Loss in Alaska, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at B12.
156. REPORT NO. GAO-06-399, supra note 6, at 20-23.
157. Rick Anderson, Choctaw Cash: A US. Senate Investigation Reveals New Details on
Jack Abramoffs Seattle Ties, SEATrLE WEEKLY, July 6, 2005, http://www.seattleweekly.com/
2005-07-06/news/choctaw-cash/. See generally SEN. COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, 109THCONG.,
FINAL REPORT: "GIMME FvE"---INVETIGATIoN OF TRIBAL LOBBYING MATTERS (Comm. Print
2006), available at http://www.indian.senate.gov/public/_files/Report.pdf. [hereinafter GMME
FivE].
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Choctaws as being one of Abramoff's "biggest clients, paying the Republican
lobbyist and his business partners more than $27.6 million to sway lawmakers
on gaming issues."' 8 Compounding their media woes, the Choctaws were
chastised in the media for procuring a $300 million post-Katrina cleanup
project on a sole-source, noncompetitive basis.'59 After accusations surfaced
of spending large sums of money lobbying Congress for this and other projects
and favorable treatment, the Choctaws looked far less appealing as a future
business partner, despite the tribe's continuing positive impact on rural
Mississippi." °
3. Just the Facts
Despite the negative media attention given ANCs and the Mississippi
Choctaws, government officials admit that bad contracting practices on behalf
of the United States caused overspending on these contracts.' 6' In the face of
national emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina and the war in Iraq, many U.S.
agencies were in dire need of supplies and services, often failing to comply
with the FARs in the process. 62 After the DOD hastily awarded contracts,
their audits found "multiple layers of subcontractors, questionable value added
by contractors, increased costs, and lax oversight.' ' 63 In response to such
accusations, the media associated tribally owned businesses with contracting
scandals," 6 although the GAO reports never directly implicated any
wrongdoing by the Native firms. 65 Instead, the reports consistently cited
failure to adhere to proper contracting practices on the part of government
contracting officials. 1
66
Following the GAO investigation into ANCs and pass-through subcontracts,
the GAO reports never spoke of underhandedness on behalf of ANC
management either. 67 In fact, the section of the report focusing on pass-
158. Dawn Kopecki, Cashing In on the Katrina Cleanup: Why the Army Is About to Hand
an Indian Tribe an Enormous No-Bid Contract, BusiNEss WEEK, Apr. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06_15/b3979071 .htm?chan=gl.
159. Id.
160. Weekend Edition, supra note 59.
161. REPORT No. GAO-08-269, supra note 125; REPORT No. GAO-06-399, supra note 6.
162. REPORT No. GAO-08-269, supra note 125, at 14.
163. Id.
164. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
165. See, e.g., REPORTNO. GAO-08-269, supra note 125; REPORTNO. GAO-06-399, supra
note 6.
166. REPORT No. GAO-08-269, supra note 125; REPORT NO. GAO-06-399, supra note 6.




through subcontracting is specifically titled "Contracting Officials Not
Consistently Monitoring Subcontracting."' 68 Moreover, with respect to the
Choctaws and Jack Abramoff, the final report issued for the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs' investigation of tribal lobbying revealed that Jack Abramoff
and his associates, not the tribes, committed vast lobbying violations. 169 The
tribes were the victims of a high-level lobbying scandal, 7 ' and yet, the report
containing these conclusions was only printed for the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs, not broad public consumption.' 7 ' Tribes must advocate for
themselves and dispel the appearance of impropriety when it arises.
Skewed versions of the truth such as this are the reasons tribally owned
businesses must beware of obtaining government contracts unfavorable to the
government. In the eyes of the media and the U.S. government, Native firms
must be more versed on the proper drafting of the government's contract than
government contracting officials themselves if they want to avoid scrutiny.
Otherwise, despite the outcome of congressionally mandated oversight reports
by the GAO, the public and media alike will blame the Native firm for the
appearance of any overcompensation due to pass-throughs in the contract. As
explained in Part III.B below, considering the unique contracting position of
Native businesses within the 8(a) scheme, Native businesses must use the
media proactively to control their corporate images.
III. Avoiding Pitfalls
Despite negative media portrayals, government reports did not blame the
Indian tribes for any sort of abuse of the government contracting system.
172
The government instead repeatedly faulted the SBA and failed government
oversight for poor contracting practices. 3 This inconsistency in contracting
comports with the inconsistent federal policies toward Indian tribes'
governments and businesses throughout history, which should be taken into
account before the court of public opinion casts harsh judgment on their
business practices. However, Native businesses face the realities of negative
media attention just as non-tribal companies have to deal with such attention.
The rules of business do not and should not stop for tribal entities, and tribes
168. REPORT No. GAO-08-269, supra note 125, at 20 (emphasis supplied).
169. G1IMME FIVE, supra note 157.
170. Id. at 38.
171. Id. at title page.
172. REPORT No. GAO-08-269, supra note 125; REPORT No. GAO-06-399, supra note 6.
173. REPORT NO. GAO-08-269, supra note 125; REPORT No. GAO-06-399, supra note 6.
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must adapt to the markets in which they participate, if they have hopes for
growth.
A. Staying Compliant when the Government Cannot: 8(a) Pass-Through
Determinations
In the face of confusion and embarrassment for the federal government's
contracting officials, agencies such as the DOD issued stricter guidelines to aid
the government with compliance with its regulations, such as the clause
disallowing excessive pass-through charges, described in Part II.A. 1 above. 74
As the federal government beefs up its standards and oversight of Native 8(a)
contracting, so too must Indian-owned businesses equip themselves with the
legal foresight and insight to prepare for these changes.
If tribes or ANCs are subcontracting with non-qualifying entities, they
should keep in mind the following tips to avoid negative consequences. Tribes
should not fear subcontracting, but they should take the appropriate steps to
create a paper trail evidencing that the value they and their subcontractors add
to a project is substantial and not "negligible.', 75 The regulations define the
term "no or negligible value" to mean "the Contractor or subcontractor cannot
demonstrate to the Contracting Officer that its effort added value to the
contract or subcontract in accomplishing the work performed under the
contract .... 76 To a certain extent, a tribe must keep in mind that under the
current FARs and DFARs, government contracting officials have the ultimate
discretion to determine if the subcontracting work was negligible and,
therefore, "excessive," or of sufficient value. 7 7 If the government contracting
officer determines that the pass-through charges were excessive, that official
can recover the excess amount charged, as determined by the amount in excess
of the fixed price of the contract or otherwise as the government so
determines. 78  Moreover, in creating the paper trail, the tribe must also
consider that contracting officials must be able to access such records for up
to three years after final payment is made on the contract, thus leaving the tribe
vulnerable to the unpredictable nature of government audits long after work
is done on the project.
7 1
174. 48 C.F.R. § 252.215-7004(b) & Alternate I(b) (2008) (allowing clause to be
substituted), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/html/current/252215.htm.
175. Id. § 252.215-7004(c).
176. Id. § 252.215-7004(a).
177. Id. § 252.215-7004(b) & Alternate 1(b) (allowing clause to be substituted).
178. Id. § 252.215-7004(d).




The uncertain and potentially drastic nature of the penalty for failure to
comply with the DFARs requires insight and diligence on behalf of counsel for
the contracting tribe. Specifically, the DFARs provide straightforward rules
on the notifications and revisions the contractor must provide the government
contracting officer if changes to the subcontracting situation arise. 8° The
notice should include any change in the subcontract amount if it approaches
"70 percent [70%] of the total cost to be performed under the contract. .... .,,
Moreover, the contractor must also include the added value that it will provide
the government on the contract where the subcontracting effort approaches
70% of the total value of the contract." 2 The contractor and subcontractor
should keep precise and detailed records of the value added to the contract,
showing costs of work performed and maintaining copies of notices in any
change of subcontracting roles, in their efforts to avoid a costly future
government audit.
Finally, the tribe must provide the SBA with a report of all work done by
their attorneys and other professional representatives who assisted in obtaining
the federal contract, whether or not the business engaged in pass-through
subcontracting. 3 If a tribe or tribally owned business has general counsel,
such counsel should prepare this report. But, for those tribal businesses
lacking in-house counsel, the tribe should be aware that it, and not its hired
professionals or employees, is solely responsible for complying with the
reporting obligation."s Compliance is maintained by submitting an annual
report to the Indian business' assigned SBA Business Opportunity Specialist
(known as a "BOS")."'8 The annual report must include "a listing of any
agents, representatives, attorneys, accountants, consultants and other parties
(other than employees) receiving fees, commissions, or compensation of any
kind to assist such participant in obtaining a federal contract."' 86 Such a list
must also "indicate the amount of compensation paid and a description of the
activities performed for such compensation.' 817 Moreover, to drive home the
importance of this reporting mechanism, "[flailure to submit the report is good
acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfars/html/current/252215.htm.
180, 48 C.F.R. § 252.215-7004(c), available at http://www.acq.osd.mildpap/dars/dfars/
htm1Icurrent/252215.htm.
181. Id. § 252.215-7004(c)(1).
182. Id.
183. 13 C.F.R. § 124.601 (2006).
184. Id.
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cause for initiation of a termination proceeding" against the business,
disqualifying it from the lucrative 8(a) BD program altogether.'88
B. Avoiding Negative Media Attention: Cooperation Leads to Sustainable
Growth
Native businesses must avoid being negatively portrayed by media looking
to sell a sensational story at their expense. As many Native businesses and
tribes have successfully done, advertising the positive aspects of the tribe or
the tribally owned business can create a more favorable image of tribes. For
instance, the Chickasaw Nation created television commercials touting their
place in the "united" community, which were widely broadcast throughout
their community and posted on their tribal website. 89 Moreover, tribes should
also advertise where the proceeds of their business ventures are spent. In
many cases, tribal law mandates a tribally owned business distribute profits to
the tribal citizens or be used to further tribal infrastructure.' 9 Such spending
shows that as tribes experience economic prosperity, so too do their citizens
and neighboring communities. When tribal economies flourish, the
surrounding, non-tribal communities prosper as well. 9' Tribes must dispel the
aura of greed and underhandedness that taints some Native Americans to the
disadvantage of all tribes.'92
To further dispel the negative portrayals of Native businesses, tribes should
spend time and money on public relations campaigns to avoid conflicts with
competitors and legislators. As described more fully below, 8(a) contracting
remains viable today through the efforts of legislators such as Senator Ted
Stevens and Representative Don Young, both from Alaska, who championed
the 8(a) contracting cause on the public stage for the benefit of ANCs and
188. Id. § 124.601(b).
189. Chickasaw Nation, Video Gallery: John Herrington - Kids & Science, http://www.
chickasaw.net/newsroom/index_955.htm (last visited July 10, 2009); Chickasaw Nation, Video
Gallery: Margaret Wheeler - Creative Thought, http://www.chickasaw.net/newsroom/index_
955.htm (last visited July 10, 2009).
190. See generally Robert Brodsky, Out in the Cold: Business Is BoomingforAlaska Native
Corporations, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.govexec.con/story_page.cfm?
articleid=422 11; Williams, supra note 1; Elizabeth Bluemink, Stevens, YoungDefendContracts
for Native Corporations, Success: Alaska Lawmakers Thwart Naysayers in Congress,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2008, available at http://www.adn.com/money/story/
543400.html.
191. Weekend Edition, supra note 59.




Indian tribes alike.'93 This resulted in continued prosperity and economic
strength for Native businesses.
However, other minority groups competing for 8(a) contracts and legislators
looking to remove earmarks and pork barrel spending are quick to point the
finger at tribes for hogging an unfair portion of the 8(a) pie."94 Collaborating
with other 8(a) minority businesses creates shared prosperity for both tribally-
owned 8(a) businesses and the Native community at large.'95 For instance, the
president and CEO of the National Black Chamber of Commerce was initially
outraged that ANCs are awarded many of the most lucrative 8(a) contracts, but
after successful collaboration, ANCs and the National Black Chamber will
work together facilitating contracts to their mutual benefit.
9 6
All in all, tribes must create a thorough media campaign, touting the impact
of their project work. Although tribes are sovereign nations, in reality they
intermingle with their neighboring communities, providing jobs and economic
opportunity.'97 Tribal and non-tribal communities alike rely on this
interdependence,'98 and tribes should budget for advertising money to brief the
community about the value added to contracts, promoting awareness of where
the contract proceeds are going and promoting pride in their projects.
Furthermore, the campaign should create a record of transparency of the
contracting process that brought about the profits from the project and winning
the award. Tribes should be proud of ajob well done and share that prosperity
of pride and profit with their communities. Creating this record not only
serves the purpose of putting a positive public face on a project, but also
memorializes the events of the contract and its upsides for future audits, such
as the DOD audits mandated by the DFARs.' 99
193. Bluemink, supra note 190.
194. See Elizabeth Bluemink, Black Businesses Mend Fences with Native Corporations:
Contracts: Alaska Firms, Facing Bad Rap for Sweet Deals, Earn New Allies with Plans for
Collaboration, ANCHORAGE DAILYNEWS, May 29, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 10230757.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Weekend Edition, supra note 59 (specifically noting that tribal gaming enterprises
provide jobs for tribal members and members of the local community, who experience good
times and bad together, including layoffs prompted by recession).
198. Id.
199. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
IV The Future of 8(a) Status
As a general goal, all tribes should create their own sustainable economies
that are equipped to grow small businesses." Likewise, the 8(a) BD program
requires businesses to take "maximum efforts to obtain business outside" the
program.2"' The first step for most tribes is to create a tribal corporation, or at
the very least a separate tribal agency, tasked with the obligation of growing
and maintaining the business affairs of the tribe." 2 Once a tribe understands
its financial structure, it can engage in more direct approaches to economic
stimulus for small businesses within the tribe. For instance, one commentator
suggests that tribes should provide financial capital and other business
solutions to small business entrepreneurs in their tribes who would not
otherwise qualify for traditional, collateral-backed loans, described in Part
IV.B below.2 3 Yet, until all tribes can maintain these innovative financing
institutions, government programs can provide the stimulus needed to launch
a Native American small business.
A. Section 8(a) Is Intact... for the Moment
As tribes deal with the recession alongside the rest of the country, they can
rest easy that Native American 8(a) contracting perks remain intact.2"
Congress approved the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009 on September 24, 2008, without a rider aimed at limiting sole-source
contracts awarded to Native businesses.205 The Act authorizes Native 8(a)
contracting to continue throughout fiscal year 2009.2' Thus, through the hard
work of a number of congressmen and lobbyists, Native business can continue
to count on the lucrative sole-source contract awards to sustain their business.
200. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supranote 5, § 21.01 & 21.01 n.5.
201. 13 C.F.R. § 124.509(a) (2006).
202. Williams, supra note 1, at 94-101.
203. R.H. Tipton III, Note, Microenterprise Through Microfinance and Microlending: The
Missing Piece in the Overall Tribal Economic Development Puzzle, 29 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 173
(2004-2005).
204. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, 122
Stat. 4356 (2008); Margaret Bauman, SBA 8(a) Contracts for Alaska Native Firms Still
Protected, ALASKA J. COMMERCE, Oct. 5, 2008, available at http://www.alaskajoumal.com/
stories/100508/hom_20081005017.shtml; Royal, supra note 155.
205. Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No.





However, President Barack Obama, alongside several prominent members
of Congress, announced his policy against non-competitive contracts, stating
"[t]he days of giving defense contractors a blank check are over."2 7 In his
memorandum outlining the proposed changes, President Obama directed the
Director of the Office and Management and Budget (OMB) to "govern the
appropriate use and oversight of sole-source and other types of noncompetitive
contracts to maximize the use of full and open competition and other
competitive procurement processes." 208 Furthermore, the OMB Director must
"develop and issue" new "guidelines to assist agencies in reviewing, and
creating processes for ongoing review of existing contracts .. .and to
formulate appropriate corrective action," which may include "modifying or
cancelling" contracts deemed wasteful.2 9 In sum, more change and strict
oversight is on the horizon for 8(a) contracting, and the President and
Congress aim to eradicate any contracting processes that smell of pork.
Unfortunately, that contracting process already reeks because of the cloud
of corruption surrounding the strongest proponent for 8(a) contracting, former
Alaska Senator Ted Stevens. Champion of Native 8(a) contracting, Senator
Stevens took a dishonorable leave from Congress after being convicted of
seven felony counts for taking home renovations from an oil executive and
failing to disclose them, adversely impacting the reputation of tribes and ANCs
that benefited from his efforts in Congress.21° Yet, despite the taint of
corruption Stevens exudes, Alaska media, among other media outlets, continue
to champion his leadership in promoting tribal business concerns by firmly
establishing tribes and ANCs among those eligible for the 8(a) BD program.211
In fact, U.S. Attorney General Eric A. Holder, Jr., "asked that the case [against
Stevens] be dismissed" due to prosecutorial misconduct and "said the
department would not seek to retry Mr. Stevens., 21 2 Stevens was narrowly
defeated in his re-election bid and is no longer a member of the Senate.2"3
207. Obama: "No More Excuses "for Waste (MSNBC television broadcast, Mar. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/2 113454 0/up/2 9509173#29509173.
208. Memorandum, supra note 125.
209. Id.
210. Neil A. Lewis, Alaska Senator Is Guilty Over His Failures to Disclose Gifts, N. Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2008, at Al.
211. Bauman, supra note 204.
212. Neil A. Lewis, Ted Stevens Rejected Deal to Admit Guilt, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 2009,
at A16.
213. Neil A. Lewis, Tables Turned on Prosecution in Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8,
2009, at Al.
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Notwithstanding potential riders, presidential condemnation, and
corruption, new perquisites continue to arise for Native businesses, for the
time being. As a recovery measure after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, Congress enacted the Emergency Supplemental Act in 2002.214 A recent
federal regulation that became effective in 2007 furthering the Act allows
contractors to count subcontracts given to any Indian tribe or ANC toward its
federally mandated goals for providing subcontracts to disadvantaged small
businesses under the Emergency Supplemental Act.2" 5 Under the new
regulations, an Indian tribe or ANC subcontractor need not have 8(a) status to
contract with the government's general contractor.2"6 Although this raises
some controversy over whether it defeats the purpose of helping small
businesses, the overall effect is clearly positive for Indian tribes and ANCs.
17
Providing even more incentives to the tribes, the subcontractor has some added
power in the negotiating process because it gets to choose amongst the general
and subcontractors as to which entity gets the credit toward its federal SBA
subcontracting goals.2"' In short, the tribe that keeps up with the ever-evolving
nuances of the federal contracting standards is the tribe best suited to survive
the recession and post-recession economies.
B. "Shovel Ready" Proposals for Economic Stimulus: The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 200919 and Potential Changes in the
SBA 8(a) Program
Certain "shovel ready" proposals and proposed bills can provide true
economic stimulus for the nation's economic backbone: the (Native) small
business. One proposal focuses on the development of "microeconomics"
within individual tribes.22° That is, tribes can create tribally owned financial
institutions to provide capital for small business startups within their own
214. Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery
from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, Pub. L. No. 107-117, 115 Stat
2230 (2002).
215. Small Business Credit for Indian Tribes and Alaska Native Corporations, 72 Fed. Reg.
46345-01 (Aug. 17, 2007) (noting that "[s]uch credit is taken even where the ANC or Indian
tribe may be 'other than small' under the Small Business Administration (SBA) regulations.").
216. Id.
217. Posting of Michael Payne to Federal Construction Contracting Blog, http://federal
construction.phslegal.com, New Rule Allows Subcontracts to Companies Owned by American
Indian Tribes to Count Toward Small Business Subcontracting Goals, (Sep. 6, 2007).
218. Id
219. Pub. L.No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.




communities, giving opportunity to entrepreneurs who lack collateral to obtain
business loans from traditional financial institutions.22' This idea is consistent
with the "federal government's treaty-based and trust obligations to tribes,"
while at the same time promoting the ideals of "self-determination . . . to
transfer control over tribal economies to tribes .... 222 Currently, the SBA has
in place a number of mechanisms through which any qualifying minority
business can obtain some amount of monies. 23 However, "[t]ribal officials
have criticized SBA programs for failing to adjust to the different legal, social,
and political environments present in tribal economies. 224 Instead of handing
out money to Wall Street banks that fail to funnel the money to main street
entrepreneurs, the federal government could help tribes fund these local
businesses. Money would immediately be pumped into the economy instead
of being stuffed into mattresses as banks wait out the risky economic
environment.
Another "shovel ready" economic stimulus program is House Report 2284,
which currently sits in referral from the Senate to the Senate Small Business
and Entrepreneurship Committee.225 House Report 2284 would amend the
Small Business Act to allow federal grants to create a "Small Business
Development Center" in any state with a combined Native population of at
least 1% of the state's total population.226 The grants would be up to $300,000
221. Id.; see also ROBERT H. WHITE, TRIBAL ASSETS: THE REBIRTH OFNATIVE AMERICA 78
(1990); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, § 21.01 ("Tribes often
require adequate federal assistance to finance social and economic development efforts,
particularly when private capital is limited.").
222. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, § 21.01 (noting such
government funding would not "diminish[] the federal support that is a necessary part of its
ongoing trust responsibility").
223. For instance, see the SBA 7(a) Loan Guaranty Program, which helps (all) small
businesses obtain loans from private lenders. 15 U.S.C. §§ 632(d), 636(a) (2006); 13 C.F.R.
§ 120.1 (2006). See the Microloan Demonstration Program, which makes small loans averaging
$10,000 to nonprofit intermediaries. 13 C.F.R. § 120.701 (2006). And see the Certified
Development Company (504) Program, which provides long-term, fixed rate loans to (all)
qualifying small businesses, but only for "major fixed assets, such as land and buildings."
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 5, § 21.03(4)(b).
224. COHEN'S HANDBOOKOF FEDERALINDIAN LAW,supra note 5, § 21.03(4)(b); HUBZones
Implementation in Indian Country: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th
Cong. 62-64 (1999) (statement of Kenneth Robbins, President, Nat'l Ctr. for Am. Indian Enter.
Dev.); Small Business Development in Indian Country: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Small Bus., 103d Cong. 16 (1993) (statement of Gregg J. Bourland, Chairman, Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe).
225. H.R. 2284, 110th Cong. (2007).
226. Id.
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per state.227 The program would provide much needed access to business
advice for novice small businesses and entrepreneurs ready to make an
immediate impact in their local economies. 28 Overall, these are only two out
of many shovel-ready projects Congress should consider to bolster the overall
economy and unemployment rates. Yet, with a Congress demanding
"specifics" from those seeking government funds, Indian Country should be
prepared to present these shovel-ready projects to obtain SBA contracts and
grants from the stimulus bill.229
Although the stimulus bill only includes $2.5 billion for the entirety of
Indian Country, tribes must endeavor to obtain funds from opportunities
available for tribal businesses in other provisions of the overall bill.23 The bill
contains $2.5 billion in direct aid "to create jobs and economic opportunity in
Indian Country,"2 '' but tribes are also eligible to compete for other financial
aid programs and federal contracts.232 For instance, "green" energy programs
promoting energy efficiency create "Tribal Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Block Grants," which can total up to $56 million.233 Moreover,
tribes can compete for grants totaling $5 billion available under the
"Weatherization Assistance Program."2 34  To be sure, businesses at the
forefront of their industries are taking advantage of these contracts, and Native
businesses must follow suit if they hope to weather the economic storm.
Conclusion
In recent years, the United States provided Indian tribes with many federal
programs aimed at promoting the growth of tribally owned businesses. The
greatest drawbacks of these programs are found in the strictures of the
regulations and in the court of public opinion. Although the 8(a) BD program
is under intense scrutiny in the media and in Congress, tribally owned
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
230. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, Recovery and Reinvestment
Package Includes Major Push to Create Jobs, Economic Opportunity in Indian Country (Feb.
13, 2009), available at http://indian.senate.gov/public/index.cfin?FuseAction=PressReleases.
Detail&PressReleaseid=32deI b92-b63b-4a34-af7a-7679d4 lca9aO&Month=2&Year=2009.
Although the National Congress of American Indians asked for $6 billion, tribes will only
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businesses will continue to prosper by avoiding the pitfalls of negative media
attention and unpredictable government regulation.
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